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Justice William Johnson and the History of the
Supreme Court Dissent
MEREDITH KOLSKY*
The conventional wisdom, generally imparted in high school history
class, is that Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison
permanently legitimated and strengthened the Supreme Court: this was
his premiere victory over Thomas Jefferson and the anti-Federalists. But
while most high school students know about Marshall's coup over Jeffer-
son, most legal scholars appear unaware that Justice William Johnson
engineered a successful coup over Marshall. Justice William Johnson is
arguably as important a Supreme Court figure as Marshall: While Marshall
provided the Court with its initial dose of legitimacy, Justice Johnson-by
championing the dissent-strengthened the Court in a more fundamental
and enduring manner.
Many have argued that Justice Marshall increased the legitimacy of the
Court by issuing each decision in a single opinion, seemingly endorsed by
all of the Justices. Although this position may accurately describe the
effect that Marshall's actions had in the early 1800s, it does not withstand
critical analysis when applied to the entire history of the Court. Unanimity
may have helped to bolster the credibility of the weak, fledgling Supreme
Court, but it would have been detrimental to the legitimacy of the Court if
that system had prevailed in the long run.
Indeed, had Marshall's practice of issuing solo opinions continued unchal-
lenged throughout his entire tenure, this methodology might still be em-
ployed today. Institutions are at their most malleable when they are young;
once an institution's initial practices harden into established habits, they
become ingrained into the very essence of the institution, eventually achiev-
ing the status of "the way things are done." Had it not been challenged,
Marshall's style could have deprived generations of judges, scholars, law-
yers, and citizens of the benefits provided by dissenting and concurring
opinions.1
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1995; M.S.F.S., Georgetown University, 1995;
B.A., Northwestern University, 1990. I would like to thank Professor Susan Low Bloch for
her suggestions and encouragement throughout this project.
1. The term dissent "is most commonly used to denote the explicit disagreement of one or
more judges of a court with the decision passed by the majority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
472 (6th ed. 1990). A concurrence is an opinion "in which [a judge or Justice] agrees with
the conclusions or the result of another opinion filed in the case (which may be the opinion
of the court or a dissenting opinion) though he states separately his views of the case or his
reasons for so concurring." Id. at 291.
This note generally uses the term dissent to refer to the practice of writing separate
opinions. Although there is obviously a difference between a concurrence and a dissent, this
note argues that it is better to have a system that allows for separate opinions than one that
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Fortunately, President Jefferson appointed Justice William Johnson to
the Supreme Court in 1804. Johnson rejected the practice of silent opposi-
tion that had been adhered to by the other Justices and put forth his
disagreements with the majority for all his judicial contemporaries and
successors to ponder. During the formative years of the Supreme Court,
Justice Johnson broke apart Justice Marshall's monopoly on opinions.
Without Justice Johnson, dissents might not exist today, and the judiciary
would be weaker as a result.
This note tells the story of Justice Johnson, examining his role in the
context of both historical and modern perspectives about dissent. Part I
describes the history of Justice Marshall's Court and the changes Justice
Johnson introduced. It argues that Justice Johnson's contributions to the
development of the Supreme Court are at least as important as Justice
Marshall's. Part II sets forth the arguments in favor of and against the
practice of dissenting, concluding that the positive aspects of dissents far
outweigh the negative aspects. Finally, Part III explores the triangular
tension that existed between Thomas Jefferson, Marshall, and Johnson.
This Part points out the irony in Jefferson's beliefs and actions towards the
Supreme Court: Jefferson pushed Justice Johnson to dissent in hopes that
this would weaken the Supreme Court, but the effect of Johnson's dissents
was to strengthen the Court in an enduring manner.
I. JUSTICES MARSHALL AND JOHNSON DISSENT OVER DISSENTS
The early Supreme Court was highly politicized and was not well-
respected. Chief Justice Marshall is credited for having strengthened the
Court, in part through his practice of announcing a single opinion on
behalf of the Court as often as possible. When Justice Johnson joined the
Court, he challenged Marshall's dominance by issuing his own, separate
opinions. This Part argues that Johnson's actions contributed more to the
long-term prestige and strength of the Court than did any of Marshall's
actions.
A. THE EARLY SUPREME COURT
Initially, neither the public nor the Justices themselves held the Su-
preme Court in high esteem.2 Before appointing John Marshall to the
position of Chief Justice, President John Adams asked former Chief Jus-
tice John Jay to reassume his former position. Jay refused, having found
issues putatively unanimous opinions in a solo voice. In the interest of simplicity, the term
"dissent" will generally be used for discussing separate opinions in the abstract, rather than
employing more cumbersome terms like "separate opinions" or "dissents and concur-
rences." Whenever specific cases are discussed, however, "dissent" and "concurrence" will
be used in accordance with the actual opinions.
2. 1 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 297-99 (1916).
2070 [Vol. 83:2069
JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON
the Court to be a fatally flawed body with which he wanted to associate no
further.3
The Court's lack of prestige was due, at least in part, to the blatantly
political behavior of the early Justices. On circuit, Justices generally opened
each session with speeches politicking on behalf of Federalist candidates.
Almost all judges were Federalists, and most used the bench as a platform
from which to praise fellow Federalists.4 Such behavior reached its most
egregious depths when, upon John Jay's resignation as Chief Justice,
former Justice John Rutledge openly campaigned for the position.5
Early Justices found the job rather unpleasant, largely because the early
Court heard very few cases. Instead, the Justices' main duty was to "ride
circuit." The three circuit courts heard cases in panels that consisted of
two Supreme Court Justices and one circuit judge.6 Justices loathed riding
circuit as it involved dirty, difficult transportation and was often danger-
ous.7 Thus, many men with aspirations to serve in government considered
the job of Supreme Court Justice to be decidedly unglamorous and unap-
pealing. In addition, because the Court decided few cases, people did not
view the Court as prestigious or powerful. Apparently, the Court was also
held in low esteem within the federal government-by 1800, buildings had
been erected for the executive and legislative branches, but the judiciary
was forced to settle for a clerk's office in the Capitol building.8
When Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth resigned in 1800, many assumed
that Justice William Paterson, who was appointed to the Court by George
Washington in 1793, would be named to fill the post. Paterson was well
respected by the Federalists, and he had an impressive background of
government service. Although he declined an offer to serve as Secretary of
State in 1796, Paterson participated in the Constitutional Convention,
wrote the first nine sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and served as a
3. 3 LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 352 (1974). Jay rejected Adam's
offer in a letter in which he wrote:
I left the bench perfectly convinced that under a system so defective it would not
obtain the energy, weight, and dignity which was essential to its affording due
support to the national government; nor acquire the public confidence and respect
which, as the last resort of the justice of the nation, it should possess. Hence I am
induced to doubt both the propriety and the expediency of my returning to the
bench under the present system. Independently of these considerations, the state of
my health removes every doubt.
Id. (quoting Letter from John Jay to John Adams (Dec. 18, 1800)); see also BURTON J.
HENDRICK, BULWARK OF THE REPUBLIC: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION 174-75 (1937)
(describing the reluctance of American leaders to serve on the Supreme Court).
4. HENDRICK, supra note 3, at 176.
5. Id. at 176-77.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 177. The danger arose from the frequent bad weather and resulting carriage
accidents. John Marshall broke a collarbone on one such trip. Id.
8. Id. at 175-76.
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Senator from New Jersey.9 John Marshall himself, then Secretary of State,
even encouraged Adams to elevate Paterson.10
Nevertheless, President Adams refused to name Paterson Chief Justice
because of Paterson's close relationship with Alexander Hamilton, whom
Adams disliked. When John Marshall was nominated for the position of
Chief Justice instead, disappointed Federalists delayed his confirmation in
the hope that Adams would change his mind in favor of Paterson." One of
Paterson's indignant friends explained to Paterson that "the eyes of all
parties had been turned upon you, whose pretensions were in every
respect the best, and who would have been most acceptable to the coun-
try.... [Adams] was inflexible .... he would never nominate you.'
12
Indeed, Adams would never nominate Paterson. Despite resistance
from some Federalists, Adams refused to withdraw the nomination, and
Marshall was eventually confirmed. When Marshall assumed the position
of Chief Justice in 1801, he immediately adopted a blatantly political
stance. Before leaving for his inauguration, he wrote a letter to Charles
Pinckney indicating his intention to use his new position to promote the
Federalists' policies. "Of the importance of the judiciary at all times but
more especially the present I am very fully impressed and I shall endeavor
in the new office to which I am called not to disappoint my friends."' 13
Prior to the ascension of Chief Justice Marshall, 14 the Supreme Court
issued its opinions seriatim, following the practice of the King's Bench.' 5
9. Michael Kraus, William Paterson, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 163, 165-72 (Leon Friedman & Fred
L. Israel eds., 1969) [hereinafter JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT].
10. Herbert A. Johnson, John Marshall, in JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 9,
at 285; see also BAKER, supra note 3, at 353 (discussing Marshall's suggestion that Adams
name Paterson to the position of Chief Justice).
11. Kraus, supra note 9, at 172.
12. Id.
13. BAKER, supra note 3, at 359.
14. Prior to Marshall, there had been three Chief Justices: Jay, Rutledge, and Ellsworth.
Johnson, supra note 10, at 285-86.
15. American colonies had courts of first impression, but the ultimate appeal was to the
* Privy Council in England. Thus, the Council performed the role presently exercised by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Privy Council decisions were announced as the decision of the body,
without any registering of separate opinions. Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the
Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 188 (1959). An
Order of the Privy Council issued in 1627 decreed that "[wihen the business is to be carried
according to the most voices, no publication is afterwards to be made by any man, how the
particular voices and opinions went." Id. The Privy Council had a good reason for issuing
opinions with the appearance of unanimity: its "decisions" were actually only advice to the
Crown. The Council's decrees and writs held no weight until they were approved and
confirmed by the King. Because it would not have been logical for the King to speak with two
voices at once, the Council always spoke as one. Id.
Along with the House of Lords, the Privy Council was the ultimate appellate tribunal for
cases arising in the English courts and those of its possessions. Id. at 190. Nonetheless, most
appeals terminated in one of the Common Law Courts, which had subordinate appellate
jurisdiction. Id. The Common Law Courts-the Exchequer Chamber, the Court of Common
2072
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In the first case in which a full opinion was published,16 Georgia v. Brails-
fors, 17 each Justice followed the seriatim practice and announced his
independent judgment. In fact, the first opinion in Brailsfors was that of
Justice Thomas Johnson (no relation to Justice William Johnson), who
disagreed with the majority. t8 One scholar notes that "[b]ecause early
American practice followed the English custom, allowing each justice to
author his own opinion, early procedure was especially conducive to the
articulation of analytical differences." 9 Thus, the first Justices on the
Supreme Court had little compunction about disagreeing with each other.
Even before the Judiciary Act of 1789,20 American judges were known
to dissent and to recognize the value of dissenting opinions. In Purviance v.
Angus,2 1 an early decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice
Rush wrote, "[h]owever disposed to concur with my brethren in this cause,
I have not been able to do it. Unanimity in courts of justice, though a very
desirable object, ought never to be attained at the expense of sacrificing
the judgment.,
22
B. JOHN MARSHALL AND THE END OF THE SERIATIM PRACTICE
When Justice Marshall joined the Court, he rejected the viewpoint, held
by Justice Rush and others, that disagreement on the Court could be
valuable. He discarded the practice of announcing opinions seriatim in
favor of the system of announcing the judgment of the Court in a single
opinion.23 Through this change, many argue, Marshall was able to present
the Court as a strong, unified body.24 Indeed, for reasons that were
politically motivated, Marshall specifically intended to strengthen the
Pleas, and the King's Bench-all issued opinions seriatim in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Id. at 190-91. Like the King's Bench, the Supreme Court issued its opinions
seriatim. Unlike the King's Bench, however, Supreme Court opinions were announced in
inverse order of seniority. Id. at 192.
16. Id. Prior to 1792 there had been no reported cases in which a full opinion had been
published. Cases either had not been reported or had been announced as judgments without
full, or any, explanation. Id.
17. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 402 (1792).
18. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 192 n.37.
19. DONALD E. LIVELY, FORESHADOWS OF THE LAW: SUPREME COURT DISSENTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT at xxii (1992).
20. The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the federal court system. Act of Sept. 24, 1789,
ch.20, 1 Stat. 73.
21. 1 DalI. 186 (1786).
22. Id. at 194.
23. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 2, at 16 (1919). By issuing the Court's decisions through a
sole opinion, Marshall was able to put forth the appearance of unanimity amongst the
Justices, even if there had been substantial disagreement. Thus for cases where a Justice,
usually Marshall, issued a single opinion for the Court, there is no way to tell, from the
opinion, whether the decision was actually unanimous or badly splintered.
24. See, e.g., 3 id. (stating that, by providing only one opinion per case, Marshall impressed
the country with the Court's unity).
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By delivering the opinion of the Court as if it were unified, Marshall
"intended that the words he wrote should bear the imprimatur of the
Supreme Court of the United States," not merely "the views of John
Marshall, Federalist of Virginia. ' 26 Rather, he wanted the Supreme Court
itself to put its stamp of approval on the Federalist viewpoint.
Marshall not only pressed for an outward display of unanimity, but he
also wanted the sole voice of the Court to reflect his own vision. Marshall
wrote for the Court in almost one-half of the nearly one thousand opinions
decided under his tenure.27 "Thus he sought not only to avoid dissent but
also, by the trend of his argument and choice of his language, to foreclose
the expression of differences with the reasoning he employed to lead to an
agreed-upon result, a syndrome of concurring opinions.
28
During Marshall's tenure, 1801-1835, the Court issued 1244 opinions
and only seventy dissents. Marshall began speaking for the Court in his
first case as Chief Justice, Talbot v. Seeman.29 Between 1801 and 1805,
Marshall issued the sole opinion for the Court in twenty-four of twenty-six
decisions; he was absent and thus did not participate in the other two.
30
The only breakdown in unanimity came in 1804 when Justice Chase issued
a one line concurrence in Head & Armory v. Providence Insurance Co.31 The
first Justice on the Marshall Court to issue a dissent was Justice Paterson,
who dissented once in 1806, the year he died.32
25. Percival Jackson notes that
[Ilt is undeniable that Marshall appreciated that seriatim opinions bred dissent and
uncertainty and that unity of opinion was essential if the Court, lacking other
recourse, was to corral and gain strength from popular support. It is undeniable
that in the first case in which he participated and which he decided, following his
accession to the bench, Marshall undertook to put the English seriatim practice,
which had theretofore been followed by the Court, at rest, by writing for the Court.
PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 21 (1969) (describ-
ing Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 1 (1801)) (footnote omitted).
26. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 193.
27. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 22.
28. Id.
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
30. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 21.
31. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 169 (1804). Justice Washington also wrote a separate opinion
explaining the lower court's decision in an 1804 case, United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358, 397-98 (1804). He did not participate in the Supreme Court decision, possibly
because he had participated in the circuit court decision below. JACKSON, supra note 25, at
21-22. Justice Johnson issued a concurrence in 1805. See infra note 49 and accompanying
text.
32. Simms & Wise v. Slacum, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 300, 309-11 (1806). It is ironic that
Paterson was the first to write a dissent in response to one of Marshall's opinions because
politically Marshall and Paterson were quite similar. Paterson was a staunch Federalist-
James Madison even referred to him as "a federalist of federalists." Kraus, supra note 9, at
166. Indeed, Paterson foreshadowed Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), in a 1795 circuit case, Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
2074
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When Marshall did not participate, both early and late in his tenure, the.
other Justices frequently used the seriatim system, "thus breaking the
silence the Chief Justice sought to impose upon them.",33 However, when
Marshall did participate, which was most of the time, the Associate Jus-
tices "seem to have had hardly any other function than to add the weight
of their silent concurrence to the decision of their great chief.",
34
Several commentators argue that Marshall strengthened the Supreme
Court by abandoning the practice of issuing seriatim opinions. Donald
Lively, for example, argues that by insisting that the Court speak through a
single opinion, Marshall "promoted analytical common ground and consen-
suality. The procedural change enabled the Court to speak in a single voice
and significantly enhanced its institutional influence and status. So commit-
ted was Marshall to establishing unanimity that he reportedly changed his
own vote on occasion to achieve it."35 Marshall biographer Albert Bever-
304 (1795). In that case, Paterson voided an act of the legislature because it violated the
state constitution. He wrote:
[W]hatever may be the case in other countries, yet there can be no doubt that every
act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is absolutely void.... The
Constitution is the basis of legislative authority; it lies at the foundation of all law
and is a rule and commission by which both legislators and judges are to proceed. It
is an important principle ... that the judiciary in this country is not a subordinate,
but co-ordinate branch of the government.
2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 308-09.
33. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 23. Seriatim opinions were issued during the 1805 term in
Lambert's Lessee v. Paine, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 97 (1805), and Marine Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 187 (1805). See DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: THE
FIRST DISSENTER 179 n.52 (1954) (discussing seriatim opinions during Marshall's absences).
34. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 195.
35. LIVELY, supra note 19, at xxv. Lively may overstate Marshall's devotion to unanimity.
Even if Marshall changed his vote on occasion, all of the early Justices were Federalists.
Thus, because Marshall was mainly concerned with promoting federalism, see supra note 13
and accompanying text, going along with his fellow Justices presumably did not jeopardize
his political agenda. Indeed, Marshall biographer Albert Beveridge argues that:
Of all the leading Federalists, John Marshall was the only one who refused to
"bawl," at least in the public ear; and yet, as we have seen and shall again find, he
entertained the gloomy views of his political associates. Also, he held more firmly
than any prominent man in America to the old-time Federalist principle of National-
ism-a principle which with despair he watched his party abandon. His whole being
was fixed immovably upon the maintenance of order and constitutional authority,
3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 2, at 15 (footnote omitted).
Interestingly, Herbert Johnson, one of the editors of the John Marshall Papers, argues
that Marshall became less Federalist over the years. By 1815, Johnson says, Marshall had
adopted views on nationalism and economic policies similar to those of Jefferson's appoin-
tees to the bench. By the mid-1820s, Marshall's ideals were substantially aligned with the
Jeffersonian Republicans. Johnson, supra note 10, at 302. The end of the War of 1812 freed
Marshall from his political ties to the Federalist party. Id. Thus, Johnson suggests that part
of Marshall's ability to minimize dissent may have stemmed from the convergence of
political views among the members of the Court, notwithstanding that some of the Justices
had been nominated by Federalists and others by Jefferson, a Republican. Id.
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idge notes that Marshall's abandonment of seriatim opinions was "one of
those acts of audacity that later marked the assumptions of power which
rendered his career historic .... Thus Marshall took the first step in impress-
ing the country with the unity of the highest Court of the Nation., 36
Many commentators echo Beveridge's high praise for Marshall's discard-
ing of the seriatim system, 37 but others view Marshall's actions more
critically. John Shirley found Marshall to be repressive. Regarding Mar-
shall's practice of issuing the sole opinion for the Court, Shirley wrote,
"[t]his vicious practice occasioned great dissatisfaction., 38
Marshall recognized that his practice of speaking for the Court was
controversial. Thus, he wrote a letter under a pen name that was published
by the Union of Philadelphia, a Federalist newspaper. The letter both
explained and defended Marshall's opinion writing method and practice.
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that the opinion which
is to be delivered as the opinion of the court, is previously submitted to
the consideration of all the judges; and, if any part of the reasoning be
disapproved, it must be so modified as to receive the approbation of all,
before it can be delivered as the opinion of all.39
While clearly supportive of the practice of issuing unified opinions for
the Court, Marshall bristled at the suggestion that the Associate Justices
were prevented from voicing their separate opinions, pointing to Justice
Story's dissent in The Nereide.4 ° In any event, by the time Marshall wrote
this letter, the period of unanimity had already begun to wane. Justice
William Johnson, among others, had issued a number of dissents. Still,
Marshall continued to speak for the Court in the vast majority of cases and
thus apparently felt obliged to defend the practice.
. C. JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON JOINS THE BENCH
By the time Thomas Jefferson appointed William Johnson to the Su-
preme Court in 1804, Chief Justice Marshall had largely succeeded in
concealing any hint of disagreement behind a facade of unity. Johnson
would serve as an Associate Justice for thirty years and emerged as the
principal dissenter on the Marshall Court. 41 As the first Jeffersonian
36. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
37. See, e.g., LIVELY, supra note 19, at xxiv-xxv (suggesting that, at the time, the practice of
unanimous opinions was quite sensible).
38. A.J. Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter, 43 MICH. L. REV. 497, 521
(1944) (quoting JOHN M. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES 309-10 (1879)).
39. 4 BEVERIDGE, supra note 2, at 320 (1919).
40. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 436 (1815) (Story, J., dissenting). See JACKSON, supra note 25,
at 22, 31.
41. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 197. Justice Johnson began serving on the Supreme Court in
February of 1805. Id.
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Republican to sit on a theretofore all Federalist bench, it is not surprising
that Johnson often disagreed with his colleagues on the Court.4 2 It is
surprising, however, and indeed admirable, that Johnson had the courage
and independence to voice his opinions, though he often found himself the
lone dissenting voice. Nearly one-third of Johnson's opinions were dissents
or concurrences. In the period from 1805 to 1833, Johnson wrote nearly
half of the dissents and concurrences issued by the Court.43 But despite his
important role as the first regular dissenter, Justice Johnson is often
overlooked in history books, biographies, and Supreme Court opinions.'
Various experiences and forces led Justice Johnson to assume the role
of the first great dissenter on the Supreme Court. Johnson embarked upon
his political career at a young age. He began serving in the South Carolina
House of Representatives at age twenty-two and became the speaker of
that body four years later. When he was twenty-eight, Johnson was elected
to be a state judge. At the age of thirty-two, Johnson was named to the
Supreme Court of the United States.45 Johnson's tenure in public office
had "aroused in [him] a suspicion of dogma and a conviction of the
necessity of practical wisdom and discretion in those who govern. 4 6 Conse-
quently, Johnson's political philosophy and life experiences naturally led
him to question the wisdom of many of Marshall's opinions. Whereas
Johnson favored a pragmatic approach, Marshall sought to advance a
frankly political, almost dogmatic agenda.
In accordance with South Carolina practice, while on the Common Pleas
Court, Johnson also sat as an associate justice on the State's Constitutional
Court for over three years.47 When Johnson became a Justice on the U.S.
Supreme Court, he assumed that he would continue the practice of issuing
seriatim opinions that he had followed while sitting on the South Carolina
Constitutional Court.48 In fact, he issued a substantial concurrence in one
42. Id.
43. Compare ZoBell, supra note 15, at 197 (stating that Johnson wrote 169 opinions, 31
dissents, and 21 concurrences) with Donald G. Morgan, Mr. Justice William Johnson and the
Constitution, 57 HARV. L. REV. 328, 332 (1944) (counting 33 dissenting and 24 concurring
opinions for Johnson). Under either count, Johnson wrote nearly half of the Court's
dissents, which numbered 70, and its concurrences, which totaled 59.
44. Levin, supra note 38, at 500-03. The Library of Congress does not have any of Justice
Johnson's papers. Instead, it has one manila folder that contains an explanation that Donald
Morgan is Justice Johnson's only biographer and that most of Morgan's sources can be found
in various locales in Johnson's home state of South Carolina. In addition to the two Morgan
works cited in this note, see supra notes 33 and 43, and the law review article by A.J. Levin,
see supra note 38, I am not aware of any other scholarship focusing solely, or even primarily,
on Justice Johnson.
45. Morgan, supra note 43, at 330.
46. Id.
47. Levin, supra note 38, at 510.
48. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 434 (1986). The
Brennan article is the text of the Third Annual Matthew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture,
which Justice Brennan delivered at Hastings College of Law on Nov. 18, 1985.
1995] 2077
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of his first opinions, only to be severely rebuked by the other Justices.4 9
President Jefferson, the man responsible for nominating Johnson to the
Court, also influenced Johnson's decision to break with tradition. Jefferson
encouraged Johnson to oppose Marshall's practice of issuing a single
opinion on behalf of the entire Court.
The Judges holding their offices for life are under two responsibilities
only. 1. Impeachment. 2. Individual reputation. But this practice [of
issuing a single opinion] compleatly withdraws them from both. For
nobody knows what opinion any individual member gave in any case, nor
even that he who delivers the opinion, concurred in it himself. Be the
opinion therefore ever so impeachable, having been done in the dark it
can be proved on no one. As to the 2d guarantee, personal reputation, it
is shielded compleatly. The practice is certainly convenient for the lazy,
the modest & the incompetent.5 °
In Johnson's reply to Jefferson, he confirmed Jefferson's understanding
of how the Court generally operated. He also related his experience in the
case of Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass,5 1 in which he issued the concur-
rence referred to above:
Some case soon occurred in which I differed from my Brethren, and I
thought it a thing of Course to deliver my Opinion. But, during the rest
of the Session I heard nothing but Lectures on the Indecency of Judges
cutting at each other, and the Loss of Reputation which the Virginia
appellate Court had sustained by pursuing such a Course.52
49. Id. The case was Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72-73 (1805).
50. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), microformed on The
Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Microfilm Series 1, Reel 53, printed in 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 246, 249-50 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905). Interestingly, Jefferson
appears to have had imperfect information regarding the Court's decisions and decisionmak-
ing process. In his letter to Johnson he wrote:
At what time the seriatim opinions ceased in the [S]upreme Court of the U.S., I am
not informed .... I understand from others it is now the habit of the court, [and] I
suppose it true from the cases sometimes reported in the newspapers ... wherein I
observe that the opinions were uniformly prepared in private.
Id. at 249. That Jefferson did not have a definitive understanding of the Court's process of
delivering opinions suggests that perhaps Marshall did not, as is commonly assumed,
strengthen the Court through his practice of announcing solo opinions. At least, he probably
failed to strengthen the Court in the eyes of the public. If Jefferson lacked knowledge
regarding the process, it is unlikely that ordinary citizens understood it either.
51. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72-73 (1805).
52. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), microformed on
The Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Microfilm Series 1, Reel 53. These
lectures from fellow Justices did not deter Johnson. Unlike later scholars who believed that
Marshall was able to control the Court because his colleagues did not realize he was doing
so, see, e.g., 1 BEVERIDGE, supra note 2, at 89, Johnson believed that the nature and
character of the Justices encouraged and enabled Marshall to achieve this degree of
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Jefferson continued to push Johnson to announce his own opinions
separately.5 3 Johnson agreed that, at least for matters of importance, he
would endeavor to write separately. "On the subject of seriatim opinions
in the Supreme Court I have thought much, and have come to the resolu-
tion to adopt your suggestion on all subjects of general interest; particu-
larly constitutional questions. On minor subjects it is of little public
importance." 4
Johnson's stance should not be viewed as a mere capitulation to Jeffer-
son's desires; Johnson had independently concluded that separate opin-
ions were appropriate. By the time these letters were exchanged, Johnson
had already contributed half of all of the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions announced during his tenure on the Court. 5
Although Johnson happened to agree with Jefferson on this issue,
Johnson was renowned for his intellectual independence. A tribute upon
his death stated that Johnson "could not be swerved from his purpose
either by the hope of reward or the dread of censure."56 It has even been
said that Justice Johnson was appointed to thwart Marshall's nationalism,
yet Johnson ultimately ended up more nationalist than even Marshall.57
Nonetheless, Jefferson's words appear to have strengthened Johnson's
already firm resolve. In the Term following Jefferson's first letter concern-
ing seriatim opinions, Johnson delivered four solo opinions (two concur-
rences and two dissents), more than he had issued in the previous four
years.58
domination. "Cushing was incompetent, Chase would not be got to think or write-Paterson
was a slow man and willingly declined the trouble, and the other two [Marshall and
Washington] are commonly estimated as one Judge." Letter from William Johnson to
Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1822), supra. Johnson's low opinion of Paterson was not shared
by the Federalists. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
53. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Mar. 4, 1823), microformed on
The Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Microfilm Series 1, Reel 53, printed in 12
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 50, at 277, 279-80. In addition to his letters
to Justice Johnson, Jefferson also tried to convince James Madison that the Court should
return to issuing opinions seriatim. Madison agreed in principle, but worried that it would be
difficult to get the Court to change its ways. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Jan. 15, 1823), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 291-92 (1884).
54. Letter from William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 11, 1823), microformed on
The Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Microfilm Series 1, Reel 53, printed in
part in MORGAN, supra note 33, at 184. Justice Brennan similarly advocates refraining from
dissenting on issues of lesser importance:
Dissent for its own sake has no value, and can threaten the collegiality of the bench.
However, where significant and deeply held disagreement exists, members of the
Court have a responsibility to articulate it. This is why, when I dissent, I always say
why I am doing so, Simply to say, "I dissent," I will not do.
Brennan, supra note 48, at 435.
55. MORGAN, supra note 33, at 178-79.
56. Morgan, supra note 43, at 331.
57. See Levin, supra note 38, at 501.
58. MORGAN, supra note 33, at 185 n.76.
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Johnson believed it was his duty to make his individual views and
reasoning known by issuing separate opinions. In Marine Insurance Co. v.
Young,59 Johnson justified his issuance of a separate opinion as necessary
"to avoid having an ambiguous decision hereafter imputed to me, or an
opinion which I would not wish to be understood to have given.",60 This
rationale is articulated in Johnson's concurrence in Gibbons v. Ogden:61
The judgment entered by the Court in this cause, has my entire approba-
tion; but having adopted my conclusions on views of the subject materi-
ally different from those of my brethren, I feel it incumbent on me to
exhibit those views. I have, also, another inducement: in questions of
great importance and great delicacy, I feel my duty to the public best
discharged, by an effort to maintain my opinions in my own way.
62
Indeed, Johnson held strong, independent views on the role of law in
society and history that complemented his desire to issue separate opin-
ions when appropriate. A.J. Levin notes that "Johnson felt himself a
protagonist of a great movement in history, and he was intentionally
impatient with obscurities, legal or otherwise, which would unduly sup-
press the underlying dynamic forces which were seeking expression.,
63
Donald Morgan, Johnson's biographer, explains that "[t]he central con-
cept in Mr. Justice Johnson's constitutional philosophy was positive law....
Positive law derived its authority from the representative nature of the
bodies which enacted it.''64
Despite generally favorable treatment by scholars,65 Johnson was not
well respected by some of his colleagues on the Court. Justice Story found
him to be "peculiar," and Marshall "gloated over his discomfiture. 66
Fellow Southerners considered him the enemy.67 It is no wonder, then,
that Justice Johnson made some of his fellow Justices uncomfortable when
he single-handedly changed the Court's long-entrenched method of opera-
tion and "restored the ancient habit of seriatim opinions, wherever there
was any marked difference of judgment., 68 Justice Marshall in particular
had reason to dislike Johnson-Johnson's dissents provided "a running
59. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 187 (1809).
60. Id. at 191 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
61. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 222 (1824).
62. Id. at 223 (Johnson, J., concurring).
63. Levin, supra note 38, at 532-33. The movement referred to here is the struggle in early
America to replace superstition and fear with a new era of scientific and realistic thinking.
Id. at 530.
64. Morgan, supra note 43, at 360.
65. See generally MORGAN, supra note 33; Morgan, supra note 43; Levin, supra note 38.
66. Levin, supra note 38, at 527.
67. Id.




commentary on the wisdom of the majority's pronouncements .... elucidat-
[ing] the points on which the Court split, and thereby shed[ding] light on
Marshall's true convictions."69
Justice Johnson's independence blazed the trail for future dissenters. In
a number of instances, Justices appointed in the 1820s joined Johnson in
dissenting and even reviving the practice of issuing separate opinions.
70
After Johnson established the practice of issuing separate dissents, even
Chief Justice Marshall issued an occasional dissent. Ultimately, Marshall
filed nine dissents and one separate concurrence.71
D. THE "REAL" ERA OF DISSENT?
Despite Johnson's large number of separate opinions, John Ganoe has
argued that the real era of dissent began when President Jackson ap-
pointed Roger Taney to serve as Chief Justice.72 Apparently unimpressed
by Justice Johnson's influence on the Court, Ganoe suggests that Marshall
and Story were the masterful characters who managed to completely
dominate the other Justices.
73
Ganoe's position is flawed in two respects. First, he fails to note that
Justice William Johnson had a crucial impact on the Court. Johnson's
early dissents laid the groundwork for Taney and later Justices to disagree
with the majority. Had Johnson not initiated the practice of writing sepa-
rately, the Court could have gone without a meaningful dissent during its
first thirty-five years. It seems unlikely that Taney, or any Justice, could
have begun dissenting after such a long, unbroken history of unanimity.
Such a dramatic change would surely have been met with a great deal of
scrutiny and disapprobation. Justice Johnson made it possible for later
69. Morgan, supra note 43, at 329.
70. Justice Smith Thompson, appointed in 1824, and Justice Robert Trimble, appointed in
1827, joined with Johnson and Washington in issuing separate opinions in Ogden v. Saun-
ders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). Later, Justices John McLean and Henry Baldwin also
joined in various Johnson dissents. See MORGAN, supra note 33, at 187.
71. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 196. In issuing the lone dissent in Bank of the United States
v. Dandridge Marshall wrote:
I should now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ from this Court,
acquiesce silently in its opinion, did I not believe that the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Virginia gave general surprize to the profession, and was generally
condemned. A full conviction that the commission of even gross error, after a
deliberate exercise of the judgment, is more excusable than the rash and hasty
decision of an important question, without due consideration, will, I trust, consti-
tute some apology for the time I consume in stating the reasons and the imposing
authorities which guided the Circuit Court in the judgment that has been reversed.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall's dissent in Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. at 232, is even considered by some to be his masterpiece. See CHARLES
EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1928).
72. John T. Ganoe, The Passing of the Old Dissent, 21 OR. L. REv. 285, 286 (1942).
73. Id.
19951 2081
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Justices to dissent by establishing, at an opportune time, the propriety of
the dissent itself.
Second, Ganoe refers to Justices as "masterful" merely because they
were able to "completely dominate" their colleagues.74 But it is disturbing
that a jurist should be measured according to his capacity to dominate his
colleagues. A masterful Justice is one who knows the law and considers
precedent, the views of the other Justices, and the moral and policy
implications of the case before issuing a well-reasoned, clearly written
opinion. It is, of course, commendable if a Justice is so clear in his thought
and so convincing in his presentation of the law that other Justices gener-
ally agree with him. However, it should be lamented rather than ap-
plauded if a Justice gets another to agree with him through domination
rather than reasoned persuasion.75
II. THE CASE FOR DISSENTS
Dissents serve a number of positive functions. They improve judicial
decisions, guide future interpretation of the law, and give substantive
expression to the First Amendment ideal of free speech for disfavored
groups and minorities.
A. IMPROVING JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Dissents are a positive and necessary component of the American judi-
cial system.7 6 There is almost unanimous agreement among judges and
scholars that dissents serve some valuable purposes. Indeed, the dissent
has been touted as "the secret of the success of the court in the American
system, permitting the factors working toward both stability and evolution
to operate in a nicely balanced system." 77 The advantages of dissents are
manifold.
First, and most important, dissents improve the substance of judicial
74. Id.
75. Sometimes Justices have joined the opinions of another Justice with such frequency
that they have been accused of not being independent thinkers. For example, Justice
Clarence Thomas is widely criticized for generally agreeing with Justice Antonin Scalia.
During his first Term on the Court, Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Scalia in 79% of
nonunanimous cases, the highest rate of agreement on the Court. Christopher E. Smith &
Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan
and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1111, 1121 (1994). Justice Blackmun was similarly criticized as
being Justice Burger's "Minnesota Twin" in the early years of his tenure on the Court. Id. at
1127.
76. The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of Supreme Court dissents. This is not
intended as an indication that lower court dissents are unimportant. However, as long as
there is a higher court of appeal, it is less critical for a lower court opinion to "get it right,"
as it can easily be reversed. Supreme Court opinions are far more enduring because only the
Supreme Court can reverse itself, and the doctrine of stare decisis makes this an infrequent
occurrence.
77. Ganoe, supra note 72, at 295.
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decisions in two distinct ways. Initially, dissents may serve as corrective
devices by pointing out flaws in the majority's legal analysis that can be
seized upon by litigants and courts in subsequent cases to correct these
jurisprudential errors.78 Second, by forcing the majority to confront and
consider alternative outcomes or analyses, a dissent improves the actual
outcome and reasoning of the decision at hand.
1. Dissents as Corrective Devices
A dissent can be used as a "corrective device" in several ways. Most
often it can be used to argue for limits on a potentially overbroad majority
opinion or to give litigants and lower courts guidance on how to distinguish
the majority decision.79 Justice Brennan has argued that
[D]issents prevent th[e] process from becoming rigid or stale. And, each
time the Court revisits an issue, the justices are forced by a dissent to
reconsider the fundamental questions and to re-think the result. 80
Similarly, Charles Evans Hughes is often quoted for his statement that
Dissenting opinions enable a judge to express his individuality.... A
dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the
law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may
possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the
court to have been betrayed. 81
Thus, judges and Justices may use dissenting opinions as a means of
debating with, influencing, and persuading their colleagues to change their
votes. As a matter of principle, Justice Brandeis regularly circulated drafts
of his dissents in the hope of swaying votes or altering the majority
opinion. He would often refrain from publishing his dissents along with the
final decision, however, if he believed there would only be minimal damage
caused by the majority opinion.8"
78. Brennan, supra note 48, at 430.
79. Brennan used dissent at times to suggest to the litigants that their claims might be
more successful if brought in state courts. Id.
80. Id. at 436.
81. HUGHES, supra note 71, at 68.
82. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial
Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 608-09 (1994); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on
Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 142-43 (1990) (noting that Brandeis sometimes
won changes in votes and alterations in majority opinions by circulating dissents). Judge
Jerome Frank heartily approved of Justice Brandeis's restraint in publishing dissents, writing
that "[t]o have discarded some of [his separate] opinions is a supreme example of sacrifice to strength
and consistency of the Court. And he has his reward: his shots are all the harder because he
chose his ground." John P. Frank, Book Review, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 404 (1958) (reviewing
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957)).
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2. Dissent and the Marketplace of Ideas
A system without dissent provides little incentive for the majority to
choose the best words or the clearest analysis. Just as competition in
economic markets generally results in better products than those produced
by a monopolist with a captive market, better judicial opinions will result
when Justices know their interpretations will be compared with those of
any Justice who differs. If no one can concur or dissent, however, the
majority has a monopoly over the opinion and thus does not have to
concern itself with competing viewpoints that may reveal defects in the
Court's result or analysis. The Supreme Court, interpreter of the Constitu-
tion, is perhaps the most vital forum in which to promote such a market-
place of ideas.
Justice Brennan argues that
[alt the heart of that function is the critical recognition that vigorous
debate improves the final product by forcing the prevailing side to deal
with the hardest questions urged by the losing side. In this sense, this
function reflects the conviction that the best way to find the truth is to go
looking for it in the marketplace of ideas. It is as if the opinions of the
Court-both for majority and dissent-were the product of a judicial
town meeting.
83
Without dissents, even in cases in which the Justices reach the "right"
result, they might express the wrong reason for doing so. 84 In other words,
even if all of the Justices agreed on the outcome, they might not all agree
on the correct rationale. If only one opinion were issued, once a majority
of Justices reached agreement, they would be likely to issue their view
without paying much heed to the protests of the minority Justices. As a
result, the majority might not be as careful about its reasoning.
By contrast, in a system with separate opinions, the majority knows that
the rationale of any concurrences or dissents will appear alongside its own.
Because the different viewpoints are published side-by-side, they compete
with each other to win over future judges and scholars. Not only will future
readers compare the. logic contained in each separate opinion, they will
83. Brennan, supra note 48, at 430.
84. Majority opinions are obviously also important for this same reason. However, it is
still necessary to have dissents. Without the option of dissenting, the opinion writer has less
incentive to determine the best and clearest logic for the decision. The existence of dissents
provides an important check on the opinion writer; the knowledge that others have the
ability to disagree encourages the judge to pay more careful attention to his or her precise
wording and reasoning. This phenomenon resembles market competition as opposed to
monopoly. When there is only one supplier of a good, the supplier has little incentive to
expend the energy and expense to determine the exact desires of the captive consumer.
However, when the supplier knows that others may enter the market at any time, she will try
to protect her position by doing the best possible job of fulfilling consumers' desires.
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also note how many Justices signed onto each viewpoint. The majority will
thus have a greater incentive to express its views with the utmost precision
and accuracy and to try to get as many votes for its position as possible. To
maximize the potential that its decision will endure, the majority will
examine the dissent for points that the majority opinion must either refute
or incorporate into its analysis.
B. GUIDING FUTURE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
An additional benefit of separate opinions stems from their ability to
guide jurists when previous decisions prove unworkable or undesirable. In
a system that permits separate opinions, a court seeking to remedy a
discredited legal doctrine will benefit from consideration of the conclu-
sions and rationales suggested by dissenting or concurring opinions. By
contrast, a legal regime that discourages explication of alternative opinions
leaves the court without any guidance or direction.
Allowing for dissent also provides citizens, judges, and scholars with a
better indication of the scope and strength of the Court's mandate. The
dissent focuses the majority opinion and requires a clear delineation of the
breadth of the Court's decision. Additionally, knowing the number of
Justices who dissent from an opinion and how they disagree will inform
people's views about the legitimacy and force of the opinion.85 For ex-
ample, not only will a 9-0 opinion be more accepted as settled than a 5-4
one, but the 9-0 opinion also gains additional legitimacy because we know
that any of the Justices could have dissented, but none elected to do so.86
In contrast, in a system without dissent, there is no way of measuring how
settled a decision is. It could have been a plurality, 5-4, 9-0, or some other
distribution of views. Thus, dissents provide a more accurate indicator of
85. This note assumes that law is indeterminate. That is to say that while some outcomes
will be more or less clearly dictated by the language of the Constitution, the correct answers
are not "out there" waiting to be discovered.
86. The important role of dissents and the strength of precedent can be seen in the
manner in which both the plurality and the dissenters in Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), discussed and utilized Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). The plurality argued that there had been no change in the original understanding of
both the factual and constitutional principles underlying the Roe decision and that the
subsequent cases had firmly upheld Roe's central doctrine. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803-12.
Thus, the plurality argued, it was appropriate to apply the principle of stare decisis to Roe.
The plurality distinguished Roe from both Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908), two cases that were later overruled by the
Supreme Court because their legal and factual bases had changed. Id. at 2812-16.
In contrast, the dissent argued that Roe should be treated exactly as Lochner and Plessy
had been; as an erroneous decision that was not deserving of deference. The dissent
emphasized the controversy that has always surrounded Roe, offering the debate as evidence
that the decision was never particularly well grounded in accepted constitutional doctrine.
Id. at 2855-67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Ultimately, the dissenters and the plurality
recognized that the stronger the initial support for Roe appeared to be, the harder it would
be to argue against applying stare decisis.
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where the Justices stand on an issue, a better measure of the security of
the decision,87 and an improved understanding of the different ways of
interpreting a given legal issue.
C. SUBSTANTIVELY EXPRESSING FIRST AMENDMENT IDEALS THROUGH
DISSENTS
Dissents serve as an important institutional reminder about the value of
free speech. Among the most fundamental concerns of the First Amend-
ment is protecting the right of minority voices to be heard. In light of the
First Amendment, it would be anomalous if the Supreme Court, as inter-
preter of all constitutional rights, refused to permit its own members to
voice their dissenting views.88 Indeed, the practice of dissent in Supreme
Court opinions boldly demonstrates that First Amendment rights are not
merely formal, but are substantively honored both by and within the
highest court of our judicial system.89
Charles Evan Hughes has suggested that the less mundane a matter, the
greater the likelihood of differences in judicial opinion. "Dissents in impor-
tant controversies may be expected because they are cases in which it
would be difficult for any body of lawyers freely selected to reach an
accord."9 ° This statement could be interpreted to suggest merely that
some decisions are so complex that it becomes unlikely that all the Justices
will reach the correct solution. However, Hughes appears to be conveying
more than this: his statement suggests a belief that law is not determinate.
If one believes there is not one correct answer to a legal controversy
waiting to be discovered, dissents take on even greater significance. Rather
87. Justice Brennan cites Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), as examples of cases where unanimity underscored the
seriousness of the Supreme Court decision. Brennan, supra note 48, at 432. Both cases
involved contentious legal issues regarding race. Cooper v. Aaron, although signed by all nine
Justices, still had a separate opinion. Justice Frankfurter insisted on circulating a concurring
opinion prior to the formal announcement of the opinion of the Court. Notwithstanding the
longstanding custom of not announcing the Court's decision before all views had been aired,
Frankfurter felt it necessary to offer a personal explanation to his friends in Southern states
who might be disturbed by the decision. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN
298-99 (1977), cited in Gaffney, supra note 82, at 617.
88. See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition,
95 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1986) (arguing that "[t]he First Amendment suggests why we accord
dissenting rhetoric such an important place in legal decision-making.").
89. In a literal sense, judges and Justices probably do not enjoy a constitutional right to
dissent, or at least not a constitutional right to have their dissents published in official
Supreme Court reporters beside the majority opinions. The First Amendment'is designed to
protect the people from the government, not to regulate internal governmeni practices.
Nonetheless, the First Amendment could be implicated if the Court attempted to prohibit
retired Justices from announcing that they had disagreed in various cases. That judicial
dissent is not constitutionally protected per se, however, should not diminish the importance
of the ability to issue dissents.
90. HUGHES, supra note 71, at 70.
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than disagreeing with what the majority considers "the right answer," a
dissenter in an indeterminate system illustrates why the majority answer is
not the best one. Assuming that law is indeterminate, future Courts will
reference both the majority and dissenting opinions to determine what the
best approach is. Consequently, the dissent forces the majority to hone its
legal analysis so as to arrive at what will be considered the best outcome.
In contrast, if the Court believed in the determinacy of law, it would likely
be far more wedded to stare decisis; the strong presumption would be that
the answer identified upon the first consideration of the issue should be
left undisturbed, even in some instances where the answer was not the
correct one.91
D. CRITIQUING DISSENTS
Although most scholars acknowledge the value of dissents, some have
been critical of the practice. Criticisms of dissents have ranged from calls
for more judicial civility, to arguments that dissents should only be used in
limited cases, to endorsements of a complete ban. While some critics
believe that dissents should be strictly limited, the more prevalent and
moderate critique proposes that only particular types of dissents should be
discouraged.
1. The Argument for Judicial Civility
One proposed limiting principle regarding the use of dissents suggests
that judges should not dissent solely for the purpose of impugning the
qualifications of their colleagues on the bench. 92 Modern scholars and
judges have voiced similar concerns about the use of Supreme Court
dissents. Many argue that Justices dissent too often, and that frequent
dissents reduce the integrity of the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
warns that too many dissents may undercut the respect accorded to Court
decisions and diminish the reputation of the judiciary: "Rule of law virtues
of consistency, predictability, clarity, and stability may be slighted when a
91. Justice Scalia has adopted this approach in his Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), Justice Scalia declined to overrule
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). He argued that because it was a close question whether
Hans had been incorrectly decided and because Hans had had a significant effect on
statutory law, "the mere venerability of an answer consistently adhered to for almost a
century, and the difficulty of changing ... the intervening law ... strongly argue against a
change." 134 U.S. at 34-35.
92. Roscoe Pound wrote that:
The opinions of the judge of a highest court of a state are no place for intemperate
denunciation of the judge's colleagues, violent invective, attributings of bad motives to the
majority of the court, and insinuations of incompetence, negligence, prejudice, or obtuseness
of fellow members of the court.
Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794, 795
(1953).
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court routinely fails to act as a collegial body."93 Justice Brennan, although
a staunch defender of dissents, similarly notes the danger to intra-Court
relationships caused by over-frequent dissent: "Very real tensions some-
times emerge when one confronts a colleague with a dissent. After all,
collegiality is important; unanimity does have value; feelings must be re-
spected."94
2. The Argument for Dissents in Limited Cases
In 1923, the American Bar Association (ABA) issued an opinion oppos-
ing the practice of dissents in most instances. "[Jiudges constituting a
court of last resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidar-
ity of conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision ....
[E]xcept in case of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental
principle, dissents should be discouraged." 95
Many scholars and judges have agreed with the ABA, believing that, if
dissents are to be used at all, they should be limited. Judge Learned Hand
disparaged dissents in general, complaining that a dissent "cancels the
93. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1191
(1992). Along these lines, the Seventh Circuit has recently adopted a set of judicial stan-
dards, which imposes a number of duties not only upon attorneys, but also on judges
regarding their conduct towards one another. Specifically, Seventh Circuit judges have
undertaken the following obligations:
1. We will be courteous, respectful, and civil in opinions, ever mindful that a
position articulated by another judge is the result of that judge's earnest effort to
interpret the law and the facts correctly.
2. In all written and oral communications, we will abstain from disparaging per-
sonal remarks or criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning comments about another
judge.
3. We will endeavor to work with other judges in an effort to foster a spirit of
cooperation in our mutual goal of enhancing the administration of justice.
Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D.
441, 452 (1992).
94. Brennan, supra note 48, at 429. Robert Bennett raises a different concern, arguing that
the "rule of law" is being increasingly ignored in favor of political manipulation of legal
doctrine. Robert W. Bennett, A Dissent on Dissent, 74 JUDICATURE 255, 259 (1991). Bennett
acknowledges that a system of pure institutional judging, such as that which existed under
Chief Justice John Marshall, would not successfully serve a constantly changing society. Id.
at 258. However, he argues that repeated dissents on the same issue have little benefit;
"[t]he issues were posed and presumably taken into account by the majority the first time
around." Id. at 260. The increasing practice of individualistic decisionmaking "has become
counterproductive, draining dissent of its power through overuse, and jeopardizing not only
the stability and predictability of constitutional law, but even its claim to respect." Id. For
Bennett there is little value in the repeated dissents of Justices Marshall and Brennan from
death penalty decisions on cruel and unusual punishment grounds. And, even if the death
penalty is an issue of such importance to merit Brennan's and Marshall's repeated dissents,
Bennett argues that questions surrounding the Eleventh Amendment and the Garcia case
surely do not merit their repetitious dissents. Id.
95. Alex Simpson, Jr., Dissenting Opinions, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 217 n.26 (1923) (citing
ABA Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics, No. 19).
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impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges
so largely depends., 96 Karl Llewellyn criticized the frequency of Supreme
Court dissents, though he conceded that dissents play the important role
of "rid[ing] herd on the majority." 97 Justice Potter Stewart went so far as
to characterize dissents as "subversive literature., 98 Even Justice Holmes,
the Great Dissenter, lamented in his first dissent that the practice was
largely "useless" and "undesirable. 99
Similarly bemoaning that unanimity had become "a rather atypical
example of the manner in which members of the present [Supreme] Court
have chosen to discharge their judicial duties,"100 Karl ZoBell argues that
dissents should be written only when the dissent's positive potential out-
weighs its negative potential." t The positive features of a dissent include
the opinion's likelihood of having a beneficial influence on the law's future
development; the negative features include the opinion's deleterious effect
on the reputation of the Court that stems from the appearance of fractious-
ness.102 Ultimately, ZoBell concludes that a dissent should not be pub-
lished if "the dissent is such that it cannot influence the future of the law,
[because] it is submitted that no purpose which is, or should be, a purpose
of a Justice of the Supreme Court, is advanced by placing it in the official
reports."
103
ZoBell's argument is flawed in several respects. First, he incorrectly
assumes that Justices can know with any degree of certainty what influence
their opinions will have on future courts or legislatures. As the sole
dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson, 104 Justice Harlan undoubtedly did not know
that his view would influence future Courts, let alone that it would be
accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court nearly sixty years later.10 5
96. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958), quoted in Brennan, supra note 48, at
429.
97. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960),
quoted in Brennan, supra note 48, at 430.
98. Brennan, supra note 48, at 429.
99. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
cited in Brennan, supra note 48, at 429.
100. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 186. ZoBell made this comment shortly after the Supreme
Court issued a unanimous opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). ZoBell notes that
the Warren Court was heavily criticized for its large number of separate opinions and for the
numerous 5-4 decisions rendered on constitutional issues. For example, on March 31, 1958,
the Court handed down five decisions, which contained 19 separate opinions and 18 dissent-
ing votes. Four of the five cases were 5-4 decisions. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 186 n.4.
101. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 210.
102. Id. at 211-13.
103. Id. at 212. Although ZoBell uses a wholly factual determination as an example of
something for which no dissent should issue, his intent must be broader unless he meant only
to limit a small percentage of dissents.
104. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105. Indeed, Harlan's dissent was "the quintessential voice crying in the wilderness."
Brennan, supra note 48, at 431. Justice Harlan dissented in a number of cases involving race.
His last such dissent was also a solitary one. See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45,
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Similarly, in 1943 Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 10 6 Barnette overruled Miners-
ville School District v. Gobitis in which Justice Stone had issued the lone
dissent. 107 In fact, Jackson's opinion reflected the spirit of Stone's dis-
sent.1"8 Jackson wrote, "[t]hose who begin coercive elimination of dissent
soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."1 °9 ZoBell's formula-
tion might well have negated some of the most powerful and important
dissents in our history; this is an unacceptable cost for judicial restraint.110
Second, even if a Justice could plausibly predict what the Supreme
Court will find influential in the future, predicting the actions of other
institutions, such as the legislature, presents an even more daunting chal-
lenge. No matter what the Supreme Court decides, the legislature may
decide to take matters into its own hands, 1 ' and it may rely on dissenting
opinions for motivation and guidance.
3. The Argument for a Ban on All Dissents
Although most of the criticisms leveled against dissent concern how
frequently the practice should be employed, there have been a few isolated
attempts to squelch judicial dissent entirely.'
12
Commentators writing early in the twentieth century tended to have
comparatively harsh views of the practice of dissenting. One scholar joked
that judges should be coerced into reaching unanimous decisions, even if
58-70 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (questioning state statute that prohibited voluntary
integration of private schools); see also Gaffney, supra note 82, at 604-05 (discussing Harlan's
last dissent).
106. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
107. 310 U.S. 586, 601-07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
108. Gaffney, supra note 82, at 613.
109. Bamette, 319 U.S. at 641. Jackson's opinion emphasizes a fundamental point: free-
doms become meaningless if people cannot actually exercise them.
110. Examples of other courageous dissents that may never have been issued under
ZoBell's standard include the following: Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting from opinion upholding conviction for subversive advocacy
under Espionage Act of 1918); Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 601-07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting from
opinion affirming school district's right to prohibit from attending public school minors who
refused to salute the national flag); and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting from opinion upholding constitutionality of military order
excluding persons of Japanese descent, whose loyalties had not been questioned, from West
Coast war area). See Brennan, supra note 48, at 432 (citing these as powerful dissents).
111. A recent example is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb-bb-4 (Supp. V. 1993), in which Congress legislatively overturned the Supreme
Court's decision restricting prayer in public schools in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990). 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
112. While too much dissent may be undesirable, and judges should certainly refrain from
using dissents to heap insults upon their colleagues, see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying




this required application of ancient practices that had been used on juries:
"How refreshing it would be, in cases of our judges in courts of last resort,
not agreeing on their final judgment, that they should not either have food
or drink, but in addition should be coerced by being transported from town
to town in a cart."
'' 13
A successful attempt to quash dissent occurred in the mid-1950s, when
the Pennsylvania state reporter refused to publish the dissenting opinion
of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice in the case of Musmanno v.
Eldredge.1 4 The justice requested a writ of mandamus against the state
reporter, but the Court of Common Pleas refused to issue the writ on the
grounds that the Supreme Court was not required to publish the opinions
of its justices.' 
15
The Court relied on two Pennsylvania statutes. The first was a 1845
statute banning the publication of the minority opinions of state Supreme
Court justices, which had been repealed in 1951.116 The second was an
1868 law authorizing the state reporter to publish the minority opinions on
all constitutional questions.117 In considering these statutes, the Court of
Common Pleas concluded that although the state reporter was authorized
to publish all dissenting opinions raising constitutional questions, it was
not required to do SO. 1 1 8 In criticizing the decision, one commentator
noted that as a result of the decision, "[t]he reasoning for a court's
decision would in many cases go unknown if [the] dissenting voice was
quieted." '119
As the Pennsylvania episode illustrates, the United States has not been
without debate over the propriety of dissents. Numerous battles have been
waged in attempts to silence those who differ. But prohibiting dissent is
completely antithetical to the American democratic ideal. Merely formalist
rights have no place in a country based upon substantive freedoms. As
Justice Brennan puts it, "[t]he right to dissent is one of the great and
cherished freedoms that we enjoy by reason of the excellent accident of
our American births.,
120
113. Simpson, supra note 95, at 206-07 (quoting C.A. Hereschoff Bartlett, 32 LAW MAG. &
REV. 54, 64 (1907)).
114. 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 535 (Dauphin County), aff'd, 114 A.2d 511 (Pa. 1955).
115. Id. One law review commentator pointed out that this decision "proposes a fundamen-
tal question as to the right of a judge to render an effective dissenting opinion." Recent
Decisions, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 438, 450 (1955).
116. Act of Apr. 11, 1845, 1845 Pa. Laws 374, § 2 (repealed 1951).
117. Act of Mar. 3, 1868, 1868 Pa. Laws 46.
118. Musmanno, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d at 538.
119. Recent Decisions, supra note 115, at 451 n.9; see id. at 451 (noting that dissents in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), influenced the passage of the 11th
Amendment; dissents in Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), influenced passage
of the 14th Amendment; and dissents in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
(1895), influenced passage of the 16th Amendment).
120. Brennan, supra note 48, at 438. Percival Jackson has argued eloquently that dissents
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4. "The Excellent Accident"
People who have not experienced "the excellent accident" of being
raised in the United States are intrigued by our system. A member of the
Conseil d'Etat, France's highest administrative court, once sent a letter to
then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg conveying his impressions of the Ameri-
can appellate judicial process. 12' Ginsburg reports that the conseiller was
at first distressed, even appalled, at our readiness to admit that legal
judgments (including constitutional rulings) are not always clear and
certain. In his second thought, however, the conseiller appears im-
pressed, touched with envy or admiration, that our system of justice is so
secure, we can tolerate open displays of disagreement among judges
about what the law is.
12 2
The conseiller's comments highlight an important point. Even if one
concurs with all of the criticisms of Supreme Court dissents, it is nonethe-
less important to appreciate that the United States system permits dissent.
The right to dissent is often taken for granted, but it is important to realize
and appreciate that the ability to discuss what the most appropriate types
and frequency of dissents are assumes a system that allows dissents. The
United States has moved beyond the debate of dissents versus no dissents.
Now that the freedom to dissent has been firmly established, scholars and
judges can focus on the less crucial issue of when and how to dissent.
The Pennsylvania episode notwithstanding, the vast majority of the
scholarly debate concerning dissents has accepted that some dissent is
productive and useful. The disagreements arise over how often, for what
reasons, and how stridently one should dissent. That the practice of
dissenting is accepted and, indeed, taken for granted is largely attributable
to the crucial and underappreciated contributions of Justice William
Johnson. Had Johnson not introduced dissent to the Supreme Court
during its formative years, the practice might never have taken root.
Johnson acted while the Court was still young and flexible. As institutions
age and their practices become ingrained, change becomes progressively
are an integral part of the American experience: "In a nation that emerged from the womb
of dissent, where progress grew from free thought, from diversity of opinion, from challenge
of majority concurrence, conformity that banishes challenge becomes a dead hand that seeks
to stay evolution-a dead hand that beckons to oppression and stagnation." JACKSON, supra
note 25, at 3.
121. Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 1190. The conseiller had observed an appellate argument
on a criminal matter before the D.C. Circuit. The three judges on the panel each issued
separate opinions in the case. Id.
122. Id. In Germany, dissents are only permitted on the Constitutional Court, and in
England, opinions are still orally announced seriatim from the bench. In many other nations,
dissents are forbidden or discouraged. See Gaffney, supra note 82, at 591 n.33. See generally
Ginsburg, supra note 82 (comparing the practice of appellate opinion writing in the United
States with the practices used in Great Britain and civil law countries).
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more difficult to achieve. Therefore, while a later Justice could conceivably
have introduced dissent, the attempt would have come in the wake of
thirty-five years of Justice Marshall's dominance and insistence on unanim-
ity. Justice Johnson came along at the right time and with the right attitude
to ensure that future generations would enjoy the benefits of the system he
introduced.
III. A TRIANGULAR TENSION, AN IRONIC RESULT
In the early nineteenth century, Thomas Jefferson, Justice Marshall, and
Justice Johnson all battled to shape the Supreme Court according to their
respective visions. While Justices Marshall and Johnson served together on
the Court, they held very different political and judicial philosophies.
Marshall was intent upon strengthening the Court in order to advance the
goals of Federalism and, at the same time, thwarting his ideological
enemy, Jefferson. Jefferson sought to battle Marshall by influencing
Johnson, his friend and nominee. This triangle of tension spanned de-
cades, ultimately culminating in a delicious irony.
Simply put, John Marshall and Thomas Jefferson despised each other,
and neither was interested in hiding his feelings. Marshall once opined
that Jefferson's morals were impure. And prior to Jefferson's election as
President, Marshall stated that he had "almost insuperable objections,' 23
to Jefferson:
Mr. Jefferson appears to me to be a man, who will embody himself with
the House of Representatives. By weakening the office of President, he
will increase his personal power. He will diminish his responsibility, sap
the fundamental principles of the government, and become the leader of
that party which is about to constitute the majority of the legislature. The
morals of the author of the letter to Mazzei cannot be pure.
124
Jefferson responded by stating that Marshall's "mind was of that gloomy
malignity which will never let him forgo the opportunity of satiating it
upon a victim.'
125
Although the early Supreme Court heard few cases and thus had very
little impact on society, Jefferson remained fearful of the Court. Although
both the executive and legislative branches were Republican, President
Adams, Jefferson's predecessor, had succeeded in creating a federal judi-
123. Letter from John Marshall to Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 1, 1801), quoted in 2
BEVERIDGE, supra note 2, at 537 (1916).
124. 2 Id. The "letter to Mazzei" refers to a letter Jefferson wrote in which he criticized
George Washington and the Federalists. Mazzei published the letter, thus its contents
became common knowledge. Id. at 537 n.2 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mazzei
(Apr. 24, 1796)).
125. HENDRICK, supra note 3, at 179.
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ciary consisting almost wholly of Federalists. Consequently, the Republi-
can Jefferson hated the federal judiciary and was intent upon finding ways
to control its influence.
126
Jefferson and Marshall fundamentally disagreed over the appropriate
role of the federal judiciary. Jefferson fervently believed in the inherent
right and power of the states to set aside any act of Congress that they
believed to be contrary to the Constitution. In other words, for Jefferson,
the states had the power, independent of the judiciary, to disregard Congres-
sional acts as unconstitutional. Marshall, on the other hand, believed what
he eventually established in Marbury v. Madison,l2 7 that the judiciary had
the duty and sole power of deciding whether an act of Congress is constitu-
tional.
28
Arthur Holcombe explains, however, that Marshall and Jefferson's dis-
agreements transcended their dispute over the role of the federal judi-
ciary. Their different ideals and priorities led them to fundamentally
disagree over "three leading principles of popular government [thait Jeffer-
son immortalized] by writing them into the Declaration of Independence,
where they will stand through the ages as the finest expression of liberal
thought in the field of politics.' 29 These principles relate to the purpose
of government, the governmental process, and the governmental perfor-
mance.
130
Jefferson's first principle, Holcombe argues, was that governments are
instituted among men to secure the inalienable rights of the people.
According to Holcombe, Marshall did not place much emphasis on the
protection of people's natural rights. Holcombe writes, "there is no evi-
dence to support the view that [Marshall] regarded the protection of the
people's natural rights as the primary purpose of the state government."''
When Virginia voted on whether to ratify the Federal Constitution, Mar-
shall did not advocate a Bill of Rights, except in the form of a concession
to the opposition for the sake of winning votes for ratification.1 32 Marshall
was primarily concerned with establishing a national system of courts that
126. 1 BEVERIDGE, supra note 2, at 20. Ironically, when Jefferson heard that Hamilton was
encouraging Marshall to enter Congress, Jefferson wrote to Madison encouraging him to
sidetrack Marshall into the presumably innocuous role of judge. See Felix Frankfurter, John
Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 218 (1955).
127. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
128. For a discussion on this fundamental disagreement, see HENDRICK, supra note 3, at
180-81.
129. Arthur N. Holcombe, John Marshall as Politician and Political Theorist, in CHIEF
JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL: A REAPPRAISAL 24, 26 (W. Melville Jones ed., 1956).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 27. For example, while Jefferson developed the Virginia Statute of Religious
Freedom, Marshall displayed no substantial interest in securing guarantees of religious
freedom, even though, like Jefferson, he was a liberal on religious issues. Id.
132. Id. at 28.
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could offer greater security for property owners and businessmen.133
Jefferson's second principle of popular government was that "govern-
ments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."' 3"
Marshall disagreed with Jefferson's desire to make government more
democratic and was more interested in placing "constitutional limits upon
the authority of the legislature than in making it more representative of
the people."' 3 5 Marshall asserted that:
[Tihe general tendency of state politics convinced me that no safe and
permanent remedy could be found but in a more efficient and better
organized general government .... [and] gave a high value in my estima-
tion to that article in the constitution which imposes restrictions on the
states. 136
In other words, for Marshall, the appeal of a Federal Constitution was not
the creation of a national, representative legislature with the accompany-
ing prospect of increasing governmental accountability to the populace.
Rather, he favored the prospect that anti-Federalists found so worrisome,
that of restrictive constitutional limits on the popularly elected branches of
the state governments.' 37
Jefferson's third principle of popular government was the people's right
of revolution. While Jefferson was indulgent towards Shays' Rebellion,'38
Marshall found it depressing. Jefferson favored a two-party political sys-
tem because of its potential for promoting peaceful revolution. 139 In con-
trast, Marshall was skeptical of the benefits of a two-party system because
he distrusted organized partisanship."'
Thus, Jefferson and Marshall held widely divergent views on the nature
of government, and Jefferson was determined to do everything possible to
minimize the power held and wielded by Marshall. Jefferson wanted to
remove all Federalist U.S. Marshals and Attorneys and to threaten the
remaining officers with impeachment."'1 As Albert Beveridge explains,
"[t]hus by progressive stages the Supreme Court would be brought beneath






136. Id. at 29 (quoting from John Marshall, Autobiographical Sketch (1827)) (unpub-
lished sketch written for Justice Story). Marshall's experiences in the Revolutionary War led
him to sympathize with the army. He saw state policies as injurious to the army. Id.
137. Id.
138. Shays' Rebellion was a revolt by Massachusetts farmers against the government.
139. Holcombe, supra note 129, at 31-33.
140. Id. at 32.
141. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 2, at 21.
142. Id. at 22.
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Jefferson began his assault by repealing the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Although many Federalist judges lost their jobs, the Supreme Court and
the recently created inferior courts remained intact. Jefferson believed,
however, that he had cemented his control over the judiciary when he
refused to allow Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the commis-
sion that would have appointed William Marbury as Justice of the Peace.
Of course, Marshall staged a stunning victory for the judiciary with his
brilliant decision in Marbury v. Madison.'4 3 While permitting Jefferson a
symbolic victory-the commission did not have to be delivered-Marshall
won the war for himself and the judiciary. Although Jefferson continued to
fret about the Court, he had lost his opportunity to discredit successfully
its legitimacy or power.
Nonetheless, Jefferson continued to look for ways to influence the
judiciary, even after the conclusion of his presidency. He was convinced
that Marshall's ability to prevent the Court from using the seriatim prac-
tice resulted in many of the important decisions of the Court with which
Jefferson disagreed."' In a letter to Thomas Ritchie, Jefferson complained
about Marshall's practice, noting that "[a]n opinion is huddled up in
conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with
the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge." '145
Jefferson even proposed that each Justice be obliged to give his own views
on each case the Court considered, that Congress formally evaluate the
opinions, and that a Justice should be impeached if his opinions failed to
comport with the conclusions reached by Congress.'4 6
Jefferson continued his efforts to undermine the Supreme Court and
Justice Marshall through a series of letters to Justice Johnson.' 47 Although
Johnson did not mechanically follow Jefferson's advice, 1 18 it appears that
Jefferson's letters did influence Johnson to dissent at least some of the
time. 149 
"1
143. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a discussion of the Marbury case, see HENDRICK,
supra note 3, at 182-86.
144. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 23.
145. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), reprinted in 10 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175, 177-78 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1899); see also 6 DUMAS
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME: THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 360 (1981) (discussing
Jefferson's preference for seriatim opinions).
146. ZoBell, supra note 15, at 194 (citing 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 655 (1932)).
147. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
148. In 1808, Johnson issued an opinion in Gilehrist v. Collector, 10 Fed. Cas. 355, No.
5420 (C.C. Dist. of S.C., 1808), a circuit court case, in which he held that Jefferson had not
had the authority, under the Amended Embargo Act of 1807, to mandate which ships port
collectors were to detain. See MORGAN, supra note 33, at 57-60. Jefferson was greatly
annoyed that his nominee had decided against him. See Levin, supra note 38, at 527-28
(noting Jefferson's coolness toward Johnson after the embargo incident).
149. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Ironically, Thomas Jefferson's belief in and support of Johnson may
have led to results contrary to those Jefferson would have desired. Not
only did Johnson end up voicing certain views that Jefferson opposed, but
Jefferson's encouragement of separate opinion writing also had a more
enduring legacy.
Although Jefferson endeavored to weaken the Court, his attempts at
subverting the judiciary likely has had precisely the opposite effect. Jeffer-
son thought that encouraging Johnson to dissent would lead to a fracti-
tious, and thus weaker, judiciary. In the short run, he may have been right.
However, the long-term consequences of Jefferson's position, as imple-
mented by Johnson, significantly strengthened the Court in a way that
Justice Marshall's practice could not. The presence and constant potential
for dissent has forced the Court to arrive at more tightly reasoned, more
analytically sound opinions. Further, dissents have imbued the Court with
a sense of legitimacy that could not have endured had the Court forbidden
its own members from airing their differences. The Court's enforcement of
the free speech rights of the people would appear more formalist and less
principled if it did not apply the same principles and ideals to its own
practices. Ironically, Jefferson's idea of what would weaken the Court has
had precisely the opposite effect. Dissent has both strengthened the Court
as an institution and has increased its enduring legitimacy as a body that
applies its principles and standards without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
According to the conventional wisdom, John Marshall masterminded
the rise of a powerful Supreme Court. While this is probably an accurate
explanation of the Court's initial leap to co-equal status with the other
branches of government, the work of Justice William Johnson is arguably
more responsible for the enduring prestige and legitimacy of the Court.
Had Marshall's practice of issuing one opinion for the Court continued
unchallenged for his entire tenure, this practice might have become perma-
nent; the more time that passed, the harder it would have been for a
Justice to challenge the status quo. As the Court's first major dissenter,
Johnson opened the door for future Justices to air independent views.
Consequently, Justice Johnson deserves far more recognition than he is
given; he was truly a crucial figure in American legal history.
Those scholars and judges who have criticized Supreme Court dissents
have focused on the frequency, tone, and propriety of separate decisions.
Such critiques, however, should be examined in their proper context; that
is, we should first applaud the fact that the American system allows
dissents at all. By permitting Supreme Court Justices to express their
differing views, the American judicial system substantively enjoys the free
speech right that it professes to protect. The First Amendment would not
hold the same value if the judicial branch chose to exempt itself from the
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Amendment's principal mandate. And by allowing dissents, the Supreme
Court and the nation enjoy the benefits of substantively and procedurally
improved legal decisions and analyses.
Ironically, Thomas Jefferson, in his desperate attempt to weaken the
federal judiciary, did far more to increase the Court's legitimacy than he
did to diminish it. He made an excellent choice in nominating Justice
Johnson to the Supreme Court, and he succeeded, at least in part, in
encouraging Johnson to disagree openly with Jefferson's enemy Marshall.
But Jefferson failed to recognize that Marshall's behavior would have
harmed the Court in the long-run, and that it would be Johnson's actions
that would propel the Colirt to new levels of strength, effectiveness, and
legitimacy.
